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IN A TIF: WHY MISSOURI NEEDS TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
In St. Louis County, Missouri, shopping malls, private commercial real
estate developers, and section 99.800 of the Missouri Municipal Housing Code
are starting to add up to trouble. Missouri passed its Real Property Tax
Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act1 (“ he statute”) in 1982.2 Its creators
intended tax increment financing (TIF) as a tool to allow communities to
redevelop “blighted” areas by financing that redevelopment through increased
property tax revenues generated by the redeveloped land.3 Recently, however,
some have criticized the statute, voicing concern that projects financed under it
run contrary to its original intent.4
1. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 99.800 - .865 (1994 and Supp. 1998).
2. See Christina G. Dudley, Tax Increment Financing for Redevelopment in Missouri: Beauty
and the Beast, 54 UMKC L. REV. 77, 79 (1985).
3. See Marc Jolin et al., Tax-Increment Financing: Urban Renewal of the 1990s, 32
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 81 (1998); see generally, John E. Anderson, Tax Increment Financing:
Municipal Adoption and Growth, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 155 (1990); John F. Cook, The Battle Against
Blight, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 444 (1959); David A. Hegg, Tax-Increment Financing of Urban Renewal—
Redevelopment Incentive Without Federal Assistance, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 575 (1973); Jack R.
Huddleston, A Comparison of State Tax Increment Financing Laws, 55 ST. GOV’T. 29 (1982); Eugene
B. Jacobs & Jack G. Levine, Redevelopment: Making Misused and Disused Land Available and
Usable, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1956-1957); Gerald M. Trimble, Tax Increment Financing for
Redevelopment: California Experience is Good, 31 J. HOUSING 458 (1974); Thomas J. Burnside,
Comment, Tax Increment Financing: “Rational Basis” or “Revenue Shell Game”?, 22 URBAN L. ANN.
283 (1981); Dan McMahan, Note, Municipal Corporations: The Constitutionality of Oklahoma’s
Central Business District Redevelopment Act, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 821 (1982); Randall V. Reece & M.
Duane Coyle, Note, Urban Redevelopment: Utilization of Tax Increment Financing, 19 WASHBURN
L.J. 536 (1980); John H. Herman, Recent Development, Municipal Blight Declarations, 23 URBAN L.
ANN. 423 (1982).
Although this Note will provide more analysis in subsequent parts, the following explains in brief the
usual purpose and function of a tax increment financing project. A municipality issues tax-exempt bonds
in order to raise revenue to finance private redevelopment in a blighted area. At the beginning of the
project, the municipality freezes the property tax assessment of the site and then uses the incremental
revenue from the increased property taxes on the site to retire the bonds. Once the municipality repays the
bonds, the property tax base is unfrozen and all future tax revenues go to the local taxing authorities. The
key to a successful TIF project is an increase in the assessed value of the property so that the bonds may be
retired and the property will generate greater revenue for the municipality than it does in its current form.
See generally, DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL
SYSTEM, 290-302 (4th ed. 1996); see also infra Part II.A.
4. See, e.g., Anne Kessen Lowell, So West County Mall is Blighted Property?, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH, July 29, 1998, at B7 (“[Three recently proposed TIF sites] are not blighted and do not qualify,
under the spirit of the TIF law, for taxpayer-financed assistance. Proponents are quick to point out that
these sites legally fit the definition of blight under [the] Missouri statute but their argument only highlights
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Two controversial projects in St. Louis County provide good examples of
the debate over the appropriate uses of TIF. The first project involves a
proposed retail development that would require a zoning change from residential
to commercial5 in one of St. Louis’ more than ninety municipalities.6 The real
estate developers asked the city of Olivette for $40 million in tax increment
financing, almost a third of the total estimated cost of the development. These
companies proposed to then use this money to purchase homes in the area for
two-and-a-half times their fair market value.7 In this neighborhood, which
appears merely middle-class to the casual observer, the homes are neither
dilapidated nor vacant.8
a poorly written statute.”) (emphasis added); see also Virginia Young, Missouri House Panel Targets
Tax Incentives for Businesses, Seeks Compromise on TIFs, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Sept. 18, 1998,
at B3 (“The tax-increment financing program . . . was intended to rebuild blighted areas, but it has been
used to build . . . shopping malls. [S]uch projects generate no new tax revenue—they just shift retail sales
from one community to another.”).
Importantly, the discussion in this Note is meant to be illustrative of the many current controversies
involving TIF statutes around the country. Controversy is not necessarily limited to those states with
statutes substantially similar to Missouri’s. State TIF statutes all have generally the same objective—the
redevelopment of blighted areas. Battles over the use or abuse of TIF statutes can therefore be seen in a
variety of contexts other than those discussed with reference to Missouri in this Note. Therefore, the
discussion and proposal in this Note is broadly applicable to other state contexts. See, e.g., John Gibeaut,
The Money Chase, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1999, at 58 (discussing controversies and litigation involving TIF
districts in Texas, Illinois, and Kansas, as well as Missouri); Mike Patty, Counties Oppose Rail Line on
U.S. 36, Commissioners Object to Tax Financing to Pay for Commuter Project, DENV. ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, Mar. 17, 1999, at 30A (noting objections of various municipalities to proposal to use TIF to build
a commuter rail line from Boulder to Denver when “[i]t is debatable if an increase in property value
would even happen . . . and if it did whether it would be enough to repay the debt”); Daniel B. Wood,
Rebuilding America’s Blighted Cities, But at What Cost?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 10, 1999, at
3 (discussing controversy surrounding a plan to build a $750 million film studio in North Hollywood and
noting the lack of concern over testing the effectiveness of developments built using TIF); Tim Pareti,
Funding Plan Sought for Downtown Renovation; TIF District Extension Worries School Board, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 12, 1999, at 5C (discussing opposition of local school board to extension of TIF district for
additional 12 years).
5. See Sterling Levy, Commercial Change in Comprehensive Plan Gains Backing, ST. LOUIS
POST DISPATCH, Sept. 14, 1998 (West Post), at 1.
6. See Young, supra note 4.
7. See id. Although the Missouri statute provides for the condemnation and taking of private land
under eminent domain, the city is not invoking the doctrine in this case. This seems, however, only to have
caused the developers proposing the project to increase the amount of requested TIF money in order to
afford the buyouts. See Lowell, supra note 4 (“The Olivette development team says it needs TIF due to
the significant extraordinary cost in developing an urban project of this magnitude. What they mean is, it’s
expensive to purchase existing owner-occupied single-family homes at above market value and knock
them down.”). Developers later decided that if 75% of homeowners in the area would agree to sell, they
would acquire the remaining 25% through condemnation. See Linda M. Billingsly, Developers Cut Price
They Will Pay for Homes in Olivette, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Oct. 12, 1999 (Metro), at B1.
8. The Olivette City Council has since decided to put approval of the project to a vote of Olivette
residents because the project became so politically charged. The City Council first delayed its project-
approval vote, then declared the project dead. See Dan Mihalopoulos, Olivette Leaders Say Mall Project
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This proposed commercial development is controversial because some argue
that using the TIF statute to change a thriving residential neighborhood into a
bustling commercial one violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the TIF law.9
Further, the development itself would almost certainly not bring any new
retailers to the area.10 The proposed development is, in fact, just minutes away
from a new, substantially similar development.11
is Dead, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Aug. 11, 1999, at A1; Dan Mihalopoulos, Olivette Postpones Vote
on Development, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, July 28, 1999, at B1. Two weeks later, the project was
back, and the City Council voted both to approve the project and to put final approval of the project to a
referendum vote of Olivette residents in February, 2000. See Dan Mihalopoulos, City Council Will Take
up Proposal Tonight, But No Final Vote is Expected, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Aug. 24, 1999, at B1;
Dan Mihalopoulos, Olivette will Hold Referendum on Shopping Center Proposal, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH, Sept., 8, 1999, at B1.
Since the City Council's meeting on September 7, the project's developers have lowered their buyout
offers to homeowners in the TIF district, and Olivette residents, both for and against the project, have
become increasingly disgruntled. Some have even gone so far as to file recall petitions for three City
Council members and Olivette's Mayor. See Linda M. Billingsly, Olivette Moves Forward on Bill that
Might Spark Recall, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Nov. 15, 1999 (West Post), at 1 (noting that "Olivette
City Council members must approve legislation that places their own recalls from office on the ballot Feb.
8," the same day Olivette residents vote on the proposed project); Linda M. Billingsly, Wrangling Over
Development Continues to Engulf Olivette, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Nov. 11, 1999 (West Post), at 1
(reporting that developers have decreased their offers to residents from $175,000 to $160,000). Until the
vote in February, the city, residents in favor of the project, and residents against the project are all using
their best lobbying efforts to persuade those that remain undecided. See Linda M. Billingsly, Olivette
Officials Hope PR Firm will Help Them Get Out the Word on Mall Project, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH,
Oct. 18, 1999 (West Post), at 1 (noting that Olivette hired a public relations firm through mid-February to
"disseminate information" about the project).
9. See generally Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing and
Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 171-72 (1998) (“A . . . stronger objection
to TIF is that it benefits an already privileged class—private developers—at the public’s expense. The
most basic concern is that TIF statutes are being used as a tool of the private developer in areas absent of
blight.”).
10. See Lowell, supra note 4.
11. See In a TIF Tizzy, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Aug. 10, 1998, at B6. The proposed Olivette
development, named Olivette Town Center, would include a Wal-Mart, a Sam’s Club, and another large
home store, in addition to numerous smaller retailers. The similar development, less than a year old and
located only two miles away on Interstate 170, includes a Target, one of Wal-Mart’s primary competitors,
in addition to numerous other, smaller retailers. Further, both a Wal-Mart and a Sam’s Club are located
within a fifteen-minute drive of the proposed Olivette development. See Lowell, supra note 4.
The developers involved in the Olivette development are not asking the city to use its eminent domain
powers to force buyouts of the homes in the area. This tactic has been used in the proposed West County
Mall expansion plan, however. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. Because the Olivette
developers are not seeking the use of eminent domain, they are forced to offer more to homeowners who
are reluctant to sell. This has increased the amount of TIF money the developers are seeking from the city
to help offset their costs. See Levy, supra note 5.
In fact, the “crazy-quilt” pattern of more than ninety municipalities in St. Louis county has no doubt
fostered balkanization among these geographically proximate and demographically similar areas. Because
each municipality is separately governed, each is free to compete with the others, to the detriment of all,
for any and all commercial development. This competition, in turn, creates an incentive for private
developers to pit one municipality against the other in order to gain the most beneficial tax treatment, at
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A second controversial TIF project in St. Louis County involves a large
regional shopping mall, the owners of which are seeking TIF money to expand.
The owners of a second, competing, regional mall sued to enjoin the project,
arguing the area does not qualify as blighted under the TIF statute.12 The
plaintiffs maintain that public money should not be used to help the mall
expand, simply to enhance its competitiveness within the local and regional
shopping mall market.13
The heated debate surrounding these two developments serves to highlight
some of the flaws in the Missouri TIF statute that allow the law to be used for
projects adverse to its true redevelopment origins.14 In general, the broadly-
the cost of hindering economic development for the region as a whole. See Young, supra note 4.
Even though the municipalities in St. Louis county are governed independently, municipal planning
from a regional perspective makes economic sense for the region’s taxpayers. From a TIF perspective,
such regional consideration would “evaluate whether a TIF-financed development in one area actually
increases overall tax revenue or merely transfers revenue from one jurisdiction to another as shoppers
transfer their spending dollars from existing stores to new ones.” Lowell, supra note 4. A more narrow
definition of blight under the Missouri TIF statute would ensure that economic planning would take place
on a more regional scale and that only the neediest sites, falling under the spirit of the TIF law, would
acquire financing to foster redevelopment.
12. On September 28, 1999, a St. Louis County Circuit Judge ruled that the city of Des Peres did
not break the law when it declared part of Des Peres blighted. Thus, mall owners may move forward with
the mall renovation, and the plaintiffs in the action are left to appeal the judge's decision to the Missouri
Court of Appeals. See William C. Lhotka, Judge Oks West County Center Subsidy, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH, Sept. 29, 1999, at A1. The judge based his holding on the grounds that he had no discretion to
determine whether the project area was actually blighted, but could only review the city's determination
for bad faith or fraud. See Move Mall Wars to Legislature, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1999, at
B2. Apparently, however, the judge criticized the city's decision to declare the area blighted, noting the
irony of a blight declaration in one of the wealthiest areas of St. Louis County. See id. The plaintiffs have
appealed the decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals, and construction on the expansion is scheduled to
begin in February, 2000. See Linda M. Billingsly, Firm, Des Peres Residents File Appeal of TIF-
Financing for West County Center, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 1999 (West Post), at 1.
13. See In a TIF Tizzy, supra note 11. Some critics of proposed TIF sites in St. Louis have noted
that, in order to be financially viable, developments of the type currently proposed would need to pull
traffic away from nearby existing competitors, rather than bringing new retailers or retail categories to the
area. See Kathleen Hill, Use of Tax Financing for Development Draws Fire, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH,
Sept. 14, 1998 (West Post), at 5.
Another relevant criticism with regard to this particular project, considering the multitude of
municipalities competing for private development, is that some wealthier municipalities could use TIF to
lure development from poorer areas. See Steve Birmingham, 2 Firms Jockey for Project, Pledge Low Tax
Financing, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Sept. 14, 1998 (West Post), at 1.
The implication of this is that the new development does not create new, high paying jobs, but just
shifts low-paying retail jobs from other sites in the area, since, in general, large retail developments do not
create consumer demand, they merely redistribute it. See Hill, supra. Many of these “part-time, low-wage,
low-benefit” jobs will not even raise a person’s income above the income level required to remove the
person from eligibility for food stamps, Medicaid, or earned income tax credits. Because of this, in
addition to merely shifting jobs, any new jobs that might be created are only a further drain on taxpayers.
See When Tax Help Goes to Those Not in Need, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 1998, at B3.
14. See Rogers, supra note 9, at 161 (“TIF statutes trace their origins to the urban redevelopment
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss3/5
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worded statute allows many projects to technically fall under the statute’s
definition of “blight,” when in fact the economic health of these areas is
sufficient to garner adequate private investment.
This, in turn, encourages the abuse discussed above. Municipalities have an
incentive to offer large TIF packages to private developers to entice them to
build within the particular municipality. While this brings additional revenue to
the municipality, it is contrary to the intent of the TIF statute as a tool of last
resort. Such distortion leads to the “redevelopment” of areas neither intuitively
nor rationally considered “blighted.”15
The effects of the incentives discussed above could hold dire consequences
for the economic health of the region, as well as the individual municipalities
which may overburden themselves with debt and not realize increased revenues
of the magnitude anticipated. This further highlights another inadequacy of the
Missouri TIF statute that may not be evident from the above discussion: its
and slum clearance statutes of the 1930s and 1940s.”); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 353.020 (1994).
15. Even more egregious abuses of TIF statutes have been noted in other states. In Illinois, for
example, Chicago’s South Loop neighborhood was redeveloped under the state’s TIF statute, which is
substantially similar to the Missouri statute. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-74.4-1 (West 1997). South
Loop was home to old warehouses, office buildings, a substantial amount of affordable housing, and the
city’s largest homeless shelter. See Jolin, supra note 3, at 91.
After Chicago declared the area a TIF district, the demographics of the area quickly shifted, and
homes worth more than $300,000 became the primary landmarks in the area. See id. This influx of money
into the area drove out a number of the older, low-income residents as well as the homeless shelter. See id.
Therefore, while the TIF district had the effect of redeveloping the neighborhood, it did so at the expense
of the area’s long-term residents, who reaped none of the benefits of the inflow of money.
Critics of this project maintain that, although the neighborhood may have needed public assistance,
TIF projects should not be used to displace poor residents in favor of wealthy ones. See id. Even if
allowing TIF for the area was a good use of money, the benefits of the project were misallocated, and
those whom the TIF statute was designed to help were forced to leave. See id. This again shows distortion
of the underlying intent of TIF statutes.
Illinois’ TIF statute has also been the subject of more serious litigation than seen in Missouri. One
Chicago suburb attempted to use TIF to drive out its Hispanic population by declaring the two largely
Hispanic neighborhoods in the suburb blighted under the TIF statute. This declaration made the
neighborhoods subject to condemnation and those residents subject to relocation. See id.
Although residents successfully challenged this TIF district in federal court, the fact that municipal
officials in Chicago even conceived of using the statute for discrimination points to its obvious flaws. See
Hispanics United v. Village of Addison, 958 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Listed by the village as
“blight” conditions, as required under the Illinois TIF statute, were: “dust on windowsills, missing toilet
paper roll holders, small cracks in linoleum floors, paint spots on woodwork or baseboards, stained
porcelain bathroom fixtures, and unwashed dishes in kitchen sinks.” Hispanics United v. Village of
Addison, No. 94C-6074 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 1994) (complaint para. 45, 58(e), 73(e)). Residents
challenged the declaration under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1994). See Jolin, supra
note 3, at 91-92.
Such abuses of the TIF statute in Illinois led to a number of proposed reforms during the 1997-98
session of the Illinois Legislature. See H.R. 525-90, 90th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); see also infra
note 51 and accompanying text.
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exemption from state constitutional limits on municipal debt. This means that
voter approval is not required for a TIF project,16 and that municipalities have
no incentive to weigh the costs and benefits of a TIF project against other
possible expenditures when preparing annual budgets.
These criticisms raise the question of whether any conceivable benefits from
the TIF statute could possibly outweigh the potentially disastrous costs. Tax
increment financing is an urban redevelopment tool that has been utilized for
nearly fifty years by local governments as part of a trend toward partnerships
between local governments and private developers.17 Properly used, as its
origins and history dictate,18 TIF can be a powerful tool for revitalization of
declining urban areas19 nd is important in the wake of declining federal
financial assistance for urban renewal projects.20
Since TIF statutes gained wide acceptance during the late 1970s and early
1980s, however, many states have recognized that TIF statutes hold enormous
potential for abuse and have begun to reform them.21 This Note argues that
Missouri, instead of recognizing the potential for abuse inherent in its TIF
statute, has instead allowed its TIF statute to be abused. Using examples of TIF
abuse to highlight the flaws in the TIF statute, this Note calls for statutory
reform to prevent such abuses in the future.22
Part II of this Note first reviews the history and policy behind TIF statutes in
general. It then focuses on the Missouri TIF statute, explaining how the law
functions, how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affects TIF projects, and how the
16. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810 (1994); see also infra Part II.B. The statute requires a
redevelopment plan with a general description of the program, a finding of blight and a public hearing, but
no vote other than that of the redevelopment commission. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.1(1) (1994).
17. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Public Entrepreneurship: A Legal Primer, 15 REAL EST. L.J. 3
(1986).
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See Jonathan M. Davidson, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Community
Redevelopment, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 405 (1979).
20. See Mandelker, supra note 17, at 15.
21. Minnesota is one example. In 1979, before Missouri even implemented a TIF statute, Minnesota
recognized the potential for abuse and revised its statute. See id. at 18; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 469.174-
469.179 (1994); Note, The 1979 Minnesota Tax increment Financing Act, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
627 (1981). The revisions to the Minnesota statute required all private developers in TIF districts to
comply with specified disclosure, planning, and reporting requirements. Further, the revised statute shifts
to the developer more of the risk resulting from an incomplete project. See Mandelker, supra note 17, at
17.
22. Others agree with the idea of urgent need for TIF reform. In addition to the numerous newspaper
articles cited above and public outcry over the current use of the Missouri TIF statute, both Republican
and Democratic legislators introduced TIF reform proposals in the Missouri Legislature during the 1997-
98 session. See H.B. 131, 89th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997), H.B. 589, 89th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo.
1997). For the text of one of these bills, see infra note 51.
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TIF statute, as presently constituted, creates potential for abuse. By focusing on
the implementation problems of the Missouri TIF statute, Part III of this Note
considers caselaw from states holding TIF projects subject to constitutional debt
limitations and states holding the opposite. Finally, Part IV proposes two
revisions to the Missouri TIF statute: imposing a stricter definition of “blight”
and subjecting TIF debt to the municipal debt limit imposed by the state
constitution. As part of the proposed revisions, this Note encourages broad
reform of all TIF statutes subject to abuses similar to those found in Missouri.
II. HISTORY OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AS A TOOL FOR URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT
California was the first state to implement tax increment financing in 1952.23
The idea was conceived when Los Angeles had trouble gaining enough votes to
raise the local share required to match federal urban renewal funds.24 Since
then, forty-three other states25 have enacted TIF legislation and have
increasingly used TIF as the primary financing tool for local redevelopment.26
23. See Dudley, supra note 2, at 77; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33670-33676
(West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1453(a)(2)(B) (1994). Cities with a population over 50,000 were required to
finance a third of the redevelopment project costs to match a grant of funds covering two-thirds of the local
project costs. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 406 n.5.
25. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1488.01 (1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 163.335 (1994); 65 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/11-74.4-1 (West 1994); IND. CODE § 36-7-14-27 (1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 469.174-
469.179 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2102 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 725.01-725.11
(Anderson 1994); WIS. STAT. § 66.46 (1994).
Although California passed its TIF statute in 1952, the majority of states, including Missouri, waited
almost thirty years to follow suit. “This fact tends to support the idea that economic growth may precede
TIF adoption, because the national economy as a whole expanded during the 1980s.” Fred Allen Forgey,
Tax Increment Financing: Equity, Effectiveness, and Efficiency, 32 ICMA MUN. YEARBOOK 25 (1993).
Two states enacted TIF statutes between 1951 and 1960, four states between 1961-70, 11 states
between 1971-75, 20 states between 1976-80, and the remainder after 1980. See Huddleston, supra note
3, at 33 n.1.
Moreover, almost every state has wrestled with challenges to its statute’s constitutionality. See, e.g.,
City of Tucson v. Corbin, 623 P.2d 1239 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Denver Urb. Renewal Auth. v. Byrne,
618 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980); State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1980); People
ex rel. Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. 1980); South Bend Pub. Transp. Corp. v. City of South
Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217 (Ind. 1981); Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1975); State ex
rel. Schneider v. City of Topeka, 605 P.2d 556 (Kan. 1980); Miller v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d
1 (Ky. 1976); City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980); R.E. Short Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1978); City of Sparks v. Best, 605 P.2d 638 (Nev. 1980);
Meierhenry v. City of Huron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984); Metro. Dev. & Hous. Agency v. Leech, 591
S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. 1979); Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redev., 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979); Tribe
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House Corp. v. City of
Menomonie, 288 N.W.2d 85 (Wis. 1980).
26. See Huddleston, supra note 3, at 29.
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Thus, as federal funding for public urban renewal projects has declined, TIF has
become the primary replacement for such programs.27
The California constitution required, as do most state constitutions, enabling
legislation to authorize the TIF law.28 Subsequent challenges to the law’s
constitutionality were unsuccessful,29 although California courts have
invalidated particular attempted uses of TIF.30 Only later, after the suspension
of federal community development grants,31 did local governments take control
of redevelopment financing32 a d begin to utilize TIF to finance entire projects.33
A. Mechanics of a TIF Project
The idea behind TIF is simple and elegant, and most states follow a standard
procedure under their TIF statutes.34 Once a TIF statute is enacted, a
municipality declares a redevelopment district and prepares a redevelopment
plan for the district that includes construction of, for example, an office complex
or other commercial, industrial or residential development.35 The report must
also declare boundaries for the proposed project area, the cost of land
acquisition, and the cost of the improvements.36 These expenditures on basic
land development serve to make the project more attractive to private
developers.37
A municipality usually issues bonds,38 generally tax-exempt for TIF
27. See id.
28. See Mandelker, supra note 17, at 15.
29. See, e.g., In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project, 389 P.2d 539 (Cal. 1964) (holding, inter
alia, that clearance and redevelopment of blighted areas are public uses and that redevelopment statute is
not unconstitutional); Redevelopment Agency v. Malaki, 216 Cal. App. 2d 480 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(same).
30. See, e.g., Regus v. City of Baldwin Park, 70 Cal. App. 3d 968 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that no evidence in the record supported conclusion that the project area, consisting of two noncontiguous
sites located more than a mile apart, was a blighted area and hence eligible for redevelopment, that project
area was required to be blighted when considered as a whole, and that to include both sites only for
purposes of raising enough money for the entire project was impermissible); Sweetwater Valley Civic
Ass’n v. National City, 555 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 1976) (holding that proposed redevelopment site was not
blighted even though it did have drainage and soil problems).
31. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 406 n.7. These funds, which authorized assistance to local
governments, were impounded for eighteen months prior to the enactment of the Housing and Community
Development Act in August, 1974. See id.
32. See id. at 406.
33. See id.
34. For a list of selected state statutes, see supra note 25.
35. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 407.
36. See Reece & Coyle, supra note 3, at 538.
37. See Dudley, supra note 2, at 78.
38. This is not always the case. In some states, a special fund is created directly and no bonds are
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projects,39 to pay the costs of the project, whether those costs are merely for
land clearance or are to prepare for the private developer.40 Of principal
importance, the report must demonstrate that the proposed project area meets
certain statutory criteria for a finding of “blight”41 under the TIF statute.42
Further, most statutes require a finding that “private initiatives are unlikely to
alleviate these conditions without substantial public assistance.”43
Typically, statutes require the municipality to hold public hearings to allow
comment on the proposed project.44 Following the public hearing, the
redevelopment commission votes on whether to approve the project.45
Once the TIF project is approved, property tax assessments in the project
area are “frozen,” and existing recipients of that property tax money are
guaranteed to receive all taxes levied on these assessments for the duration of
the project.46 This simply means that those entities (usually schools) that
received the property tax money before the project will continue to receive the
same amount of money for the duration of the project. The property owner pays
all taxes due on the property based on its actual value,47 however, and all
revenues from any increases in tax assessments that occur because of the
issued. The end result is the same: the incremental property tax revenues are used to repay the debt from
the project whether incurred through bonds or otherwise. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 408.
39. See infra Part II.B.4 for a discussion of the implications for TIF of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
40. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 290.
41. In order for a city or municipality to take private property by eminent domain, the city must
have a valid public purpose. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Dudley, supra note 2, at 88. The use of
TIF does not affect the public purpose of the project—it must be an acceptable public purpose under the
state constitution. See Mandelker, supra note 17, at 15. Generally, courts find that the redevelopment of a
blighted area in itself is a proper public purpose. See id. at 16. If the TIF statute is not limited to blighted
areas, however, then the economic development objectives of the project must be for some other proper
public use. See id. In this vein, Professor Mandelker notes that detailed legislative findings supporting the
public purpose of particular economic development legislation, including TIF legislation, are essential, as
courts give “considerable attention” to such findings when considering the constitutionality of the
legislation. Id. at 20.
42. See Reece & Coyle, supra note 3; see also infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of what qualifies as
“blight” in Missouri.
43. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 409. The establishment of a TIF district by the municipality
reflects two assumptions underlying the use of TIF for redevelopment. First, the community has concluded
that “property values in the area would remain static or decline without public intervention,” and second,
“increases in land values and assessments in the project area are caused by the redevelopment authority’s
own promotion of economic activity in the district.” Id. at 409-10. These assumptions are of significant
importance in the projects discussed in Part I. It is not clear that this “but for” assumption of the need for
redevelopment is met in either case.
44. See Reece & Coyle, supra note 3, at 538; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 99.830.1 (1994); infra
note 61.
45. See Reece & Coyle, supra note 3, at 538.
46. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 290.
47. See Dudley, supra note 2, at 77.
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redevelopment (“tax increments”) are used to repay the bonds issued to fund the
project.48 When all of the municipality’s costs have been paid, or the bonds are
retired, the TIF district’s tax assessments are unfrozen and all taxing districts
receive increased revenues from the redeveloped land.49
B. TIF In Missouri
1. Required Findings
Missouri’s Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act50 is
a typical TIF statute. The statute defines “blighted area” as:
An area which, by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate
street layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site
improvements, improper subdivision or obsolete platting, the existence of
conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or
any combination of such factors, retards the provision of housing
accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability or a
menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its present
condition and use.51
48. See id. For an example of the calculation of a “tax increment,” and how the funds are allocated
between the project and the existing tax recipients, see Forgey, supra note 25, at 32.
49. See Dudley, supra note 2, at 77. Thus, the success, and indeed, justification, of TIF as a
redevelopment tool depends on the assumptions discussed supra at note 43. On its face, and in the short
time of a single tax year, the diversion of the increments from the increased property taxes apparently
subsidizes the project area. If these assumptions are met, however; that is, if the area truly is blighted and
would not have received the development and the increased property value but for the redevelopment, then
the increment is due solely to the redevelopment, and the tax funds represent money that would not have
been available otherwise. Therefore, in the long-term, under these assumptions, the affected taxing districts
and citizens of the municipality gain from the increased value brought by the redevelopment. See
Davidson, supra note 19, at 411.
50. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.800-.865 (1994 and Supp. 1998).
51. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805.1 (1994). Representative Levin introduced a bill in the Missouri
Legislature in 1998 that would further require that “[p]roof of whether an area is a blighted area shall be
shown by clear and convincing evidence.” H.B. 1486, 89th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997). The
proposal, however, contains no criteria as to the establishment of “clear and convincing” evidence. See id.
Representative Rizzo, on the other hand, introduced a bill with a more comprehensive revision of
“blighted area.” In addition to the above definition, Representative Rizzo would require satisfaction of
either (a) or (b) below:
a. The area has the following characteristics:
(a) It is one of pervasive poverty, unemployment and general distress;
(b) At least sixty-five percent of the residents living in the area have incomes below eighty percent of
the median income of all residents within the state of Missouri according to the last decennial census
or other appropriate source as approved by the director; and
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The statute requires a finding, under the redevelopment plan adopted by the
municipality, that the redevelopment area as a whole is blighted,52 a
conservation area,53 or an economic development area.54 Further, the
(c) The level of unemployment of persons . . . within the area exceeds one and one-half times the
average rate of unemployment of the state of Missouri over the previous twelve months, or the
percentage of area residents employed on a full-time basis is less than fifty percent of the statewide
percentage of residents employed on a full-time basis; or
b. The area is characterized by the following physical or economic conditions;
(a) Buildings in the area are unsafe or unhealthy for persons to live or work in. This may be caused
by such factors as serious building code violations, dilapidation and deterioration, defective design,
or faulty or inadequate utilities; or
(b) Depreciated or stagnant property values or impaired investments; or
(c) There are abnormally high business vacancies, abnormally low lease rates, high turnover rates,
abandoned buildings or excessive vacant lots; or
(d) A high crime rate that constitutes a serious threat to the public safety and welfare; or
(e) Vacant land that is without one or more industrial, commercial or residential buildings or is,
prior to being designated as part of a redevelopment area, subject to chronic flooding which
adversely affects real property in the area.
H.B. 131, 89th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997). The Missouri Legislature, however, did not pass any of
these intiatives.
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
53. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805.2 (1994). A “conservation area” is an area within the boundaries
of the redevelopment area in which fifty percent or more of the structures in the area have an age of thirty-
five years or more, although such an area is not yet a blighted area. In addition to building age, the area
must be detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare and be likely to become a blighted area
. . . because of any one or more of the following factors: dilapidation; obsolescence; deterioration; illegal
use of individual structures; presence of structures below minimum code standards; abandonment;
excessive vacancies; overcrowding of structures and community facilities; lack of ventilation, light or
sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities; excessive land coverage; deleterious land use or layout,
depreciation of physical maintenance; and lack of community planning.
Id. § 99.805.2. The statute notes that the area must meet at least three of the above factors in order to be a
conservation area. See id. The statute is arguably ambiguous, however, as to what finding would be
necessary to declare a conservation area. The first sentence of section three seems to stand on its own; a
building must only be thirty-five years old in order to be declared a conservation area. Logically, however,
it would seem as though the other factors would also need to be present in order for a true need for
redevelopment to arise. See id.
The text, in requiring three of the factors to be present, seems to assume that those factors will be
present in any area in which fifty percent of the buildings are over thirty-five years old. On the other hand,
many cities have older, well-maintained neighborhoods that add to the value of the land, not detract from
it. Therefore, it would seem to be necessary that the factors tending toward blight would also be present.
See id.
54. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805.5(a)-(c) (1994). An economic development area does not meet
the requirements for a blighted area or a conservation area, but requires a finding by the municipality that
redevelopment will not be solely used for development of commercial businesses that unfairly compete in
the local economy. Further, the economic development area must be in the public interest because it either
discourages “commerce, industry or manufacturing” from leaving the state, results in increased
employment in the municipality, or results in “preservation or enhancement” of the tax base of the
municipality. Id.
TIF may only be used in an economic development area to fund highways, roads, streets, bridges,
sewers, traffic control systems and devices, water distribution and supply systems, and curbing and
sidewalks. TIF may not be used within an economic development area to fund buildings. See id.
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redevelopment commission must find that, in addition to being a blighted area, a
conservation area, or an economic development area, the area “has not been
subject to growth and development through investment by private enterprise and
would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed without the adoption of tax
increment financing.”55 These findings must include a detailed description of the
factors that qualify the land for redevelopment under the statute.56
The redevelopment project must be completed and the bonds retired within
twenty-three years after the adoption of the ordinance approving the project.57 In
addition, the redevelopment plan must include a cost-benefit analysis of the
economic impact of the plan on the taxing districts involved, as well as a
statement as to the economic effect of building or not building it.58
The plan must give a general description of the program, the estimated cost
of redevelopment, the sources of funds to pay for the project, the terms of those
sources, the most recent assessed value of the property, the use of the land upon
completion of the project, and its estimated value upon completion of the
project.59
2. Public Disclosure
The TIF commission must hold a public hearing prior to the adoption of a
redevelopment plan or project,60 and notice of the hearing must be given by
§ 99.825.2.
55. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810.1 (1994). This is the “but for” assumption noted by Davidson. See
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
56. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810 (1994). Under section 99.810.2, the redevelopment plan must
conform to the comprehensive plan for the development of the municipality as a whole. See id. §
99.810.2. The ambiguity of the TIF statute again takes its toll here, however. Olivette recently changed its
comprehensive plan to allow commercial development and to change the zoning of the area so that a
proposed redevelopment area would fall under the technical requirements of the statute. See Levy, supra
note 4. It is not argued that a municipality should never change its comprehensive plan, but instead that
the logical order would be to change the plan because it was in the best interest of the community and then
to decide on a redevelopment initiative. In the case of Olivette, the private developer approached the
municipality with a proposal for a new retail development, and this prompted the city to change its
comprehensive plan to include just this sort of commercial development.
57. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810.3 (1994). In addition, the ordinance approving the redevelopment
plan must be approved within ten years of the adoption of the redevelopment project, and no property may
be taken by eminent domain later than five years from the adoption of the ordinance approving the project.
See id.
58. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.810.5 (1994 & Supp. 1998). Notably, however, the statute does not
require a comparative analysis of alternative projects.
59. See id. § 99.810.
60. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.825.1 (1994).
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publication and mailing.61 At the public hearing, any interested party may file
written objections to or comments on the proposed plan or may comment
orally.62
After the public hearing, changes can be made to the redevelopment plan
without further hearing, provided those changes do not enlarge the boundaries of
the redevelopment area, affect the general proposed land use, or materially
change the nature of the project. Further, each taxing district must receive
written notice of the proposed change and the proposed change must be
published.63
3. Repayment of Bonds
When the value of a redeveloped parcel of property exceeds its initial
assessed, “frozen” value, the municipality allocates the portion of the tax
revenue attributable to the initial value of the property to the appropriate taxing
districts, in the amount they would have received had the project not been
undertaken.64
The incremental increase in revenues from the property, “payment in lieu of
taxes” (“PILOTS”), is paid to the municipal treasurer who deposits the
payments in a “Special Allocation Fund.” The purpose of the Special Allocation
Fund is to repay the debt incurred during the redevelopment project.65 In
addition, fifty percent of the incremental revenue from taxes generated by
economic activities, “economic activity taxes” (“EAT”), within the
redevelopment area, as measured against the economic activity taxes from the
previous year, may be allocated to the Special Allocation Fund and used to
retire bonds.66
61. See id. § 99.830.1. Notice by publication must be given at least twice, with the first publication
not more than thirty days, and the second publication not more than ten days prior to the hearing. Notice
must be published in a “newspaper of general circulation in the area of the proposed redevelopment.” Id.
Notices must be sent by certified mail to all persons who paid general property taxes on each parcel of
property located within the redevelopment area. See id. The notices issued must include the following: the
time and place of the public hearing, the boundaries of the proposed project, a statement that all interested
parties may attend the public hearing and be heard, and a description of the proposed project and a
location where the entire proposal may be viewed. See id. § 99.830.2(1)-(4).
62. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.825.1 (1994).
63. See id. § 99.825.1.
64. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.845.1(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
65. See id. § 99.845.1(2).
66. See id. § 99.845.3. This excludes personal property taxes, taxes imposed on sales or charges for
hotel guests, taxes imposed on public transportation. See id. These revenues are paid into a “separate
segregated account within the special allocation fund.” Id.
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A municipality may secure tax increment bonds with the money in the
Special Allocation Fund and may retire those obligations with that revenue.67
The bonds bear interest as determined by the municipality,68 and the bonds may
mature at any time up to twenty-three years from the date of issuance.69
Although Missouri’s TIF statute is closely modeled after the Illinois statute,
Missouri’s statute does not authorize municipalities to issue debt secured by the
full faith and credit of the city or the state.70 The Illinois statute contains such a
provision.71
The Missouri statute allows revenue bonds to be issued, secured by the
revenue of the redevelopment project, and for a mortgage on all or part of the
project.72 Finally, the Missouri statute contains the important disclaimer:
Neither the municipality, its duly authorized commission, the
commissioners or the officers of a municipality nor any person executing
any obligation shall be personally liable for such obligation by reason of
the issuance thereof. The obligations issued pursuant to sections 99.800
to 99.865 shall not be a general obligation of the municipality, county,
state of Missouri, or any political subdivision thereof, nor in any event
shall such obligation be payable out of any funds or properties other than
those specifically pledged as security therefor. The obligations shall not
constitute indebtedness within the meaning of any constitutional,
statutory or charter debt limitation or restriction.73
4. Tax Reform Act of 1986
Prior to 1986, municipalities generally financed redevelopment projects
through tax-exempt bonds.74 The tax-exempt status of municipal bonds has
67. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.835.1 (1994).
68. See id. § 99.835.3; See also infra Part II.B.4, discussing the implications of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 on the tax-exempt status of tax increment bonds and the importance of tax-exempt status for
interest on the bonds.
69. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.835.3 (1994).
70. See Dudley, supra note 2, at 82.
71. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-74.4-1 (West 1993).
72. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.835.2 (1994); See also Dudley, supra note 2, at 82.
73. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.835.5 (1994) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text; infra Part III.
74. See Catherine Michel, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime: Tax Increment Financing in Indiana,
71 IND. L.J. 457, 461 (1996). Municipal bonds typically fall into two categories: general obligation
bonds, which are secured by the full faith, credit, and taxing power of the government, and revenue or
special fund bonds, which are secured by the revenues or receipts of a project or a special fund. Revenue
bonds are not backed by the full faith and credit of the government. TIF bonds fall into this second
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been an important contributor to the growth of municipal borrowing.75 Interest
on these municipal bonds had always been tax-exempt.76 Th  Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (the Act),77 however, placed limitations on tax-exempt municipal
bonds, making it more difficult to qualify the interest on those bonds as tax-
exempt.78 In turn, this affected the interest rates that municipalities had to offer
in order to make their bonds attractive to investors.79
category. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 353. Further, investors who buy revenue bonds
typically demand a higher rate of return since those bonds are riskier. See id.
75. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 353. Those who buy bonds issued by state or local
governments do not have to pay income tax on the interest generated by those bonds. See id; see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803); I.R.C. § 103 (1994).
Typically, the largest holders of these bonds are commercial banks and insurance companies. The
income tax exemption benefits wealthy investors, however. For example, on a taxable $100,000
investment with a ten percent rate of return, that is, $10,000 per year, a bond-holder in the twenty-eight
percent tax bracket would normally incur $2,800 of tax liability. On a tax-exempt bond, however, the full
$10,000 is realized. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 353. Thus, a rational, profit-maximizing
bond-holder would be willing to accept a lower interest rate on that bond, which saves the local
government money.
This differential between the lower rate of interest paid on a tax-exempt municipal bond and the
higher rate of interest on a taxable bond is known as a “putative” tax. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH
BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 263 (11th ed. 1997). A bond holder would be just as satisfied
with a 7.8% return on the tax-exempt bond as he or she would on the 10% non-tax-exempt bond. This, in
turn, increases the attractiveness to municipalities of issuing debt, the municipalities issue more debt, and
investors spend more money buying municipal bonds. This results, however, in a loss of revenue for the
federal government (in the form of the putative tax), thus prompting tax reform. See id. at 264. The
Treasury estimated the loss of federal revenue at $3.2 billion in 1981 and $4.2 billion in 1982 as a result
of private activity tax-exempt bonds outstanding in those years. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at
377 (citing Conference Committee on the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)). It
is important to note, however, that this putative tax, or flow of money from the federal government to state
governments, only raises equity concerns when purchasers of tax-exempt bonds have marginal tax rates
higher than the spread between the tax-exempt and the taxable rate. When this occurs, investors can save
money by investing in tax-exempt bonds and paying the putative tax rather than the actual one. See KLEIN
& BLANKMAN, supra, at 264.
76. See Michael A. Livingston, Reform or Revolution? Tax-Exempt Bonds, The Legislative
Process, and the Meaning of Tax Reform, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1989) (noting that
“[i]nterest on state and local obligations has been tax-exempt since the original income tax was enacted in
1913.”). The distinction between bonds that were tax-exempt and those that were taxable arose from
abuses in private business borrowing. During the Depression, companies borrowed from the government
merely to avoid paying the higher interest that resulted when the bonds were not tax-exempt, and therefore,
the municipality issuing the bonds was merely a funnel for the money and was being used to finance only
private development. See id.
77. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
78. See Michel, supra note 74.
79. See David E. Cardwell & Harold R. Bucholtz, Tax-Exempt Redevelopment Financing in
Florida, 20 STETSON L. REV. 667, 681 (1991). If investors had to pay income tax on the interest they
received from the bonds, they would require a higher rate of return on the bonds to cover the opportunity
cost of not pursuing other investments. This, in turn, would raise the cost of the project to the city. If the
interest is not tax-exempt, the municipality could pay as much as one or two percent more on the bonds.
Over a twenty-year period, this could result in as much as $2,000,000 more in interest on a $10,000,000
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Tax increment bonds, called qualified redevelopment bonds under the Act,
are tax-exempt private activity bonds,80 and are therefore subject to the volume
debt. See id. at 680-81.
80. Prior to the Tax Reform Act, almost all government bonds fell into two categories: industrial
development bonds (“IDBs”) and non-industrial development bonds (“non-IDBs”). See Cardwell &
Bucholtz, supra note 79, at 681. Non-IDBs financed projects that benefited the general public, and IDBs
financed projects that benefited only a few private parties. Non-IDBs were tax-exempt, while IDBs were
not. See id.
Whether a particular bond is either an IBD or a non-IBD turned on the administration of two tests:
the “trade or business” test, which focused on the type of entity that was to use the funds, and the “security
interest” test, which focused on the method of bond repayment or how their repayment was secured. See
Livingston, supra note 76, at 1174.
A bond fulfilled the trade or business test if it was “issued as part of an issue all or a major portion of
the proceeds of which [were] to be used directly or indirectly in any trade or business carried on by any
person who [was] not an exempt person.” Cardwell & Bucholtz, supra note 79, at 681. Any bond
“passing” this test was an IDB. See id; see also Livingston, supra note 76, at 1174.
A bond fulfilled the “security interest” test if the payment of the principal or interest was, in whole or
major part:
(i) secured by any interest in property used or to be used in a trade or business or in payments in respect
of such property, or
(ii) to be derived from payments in respect of property, or borrowed money, used or to be used in a trade
or business.
I.R.C. § 103(b)(2)(B) (1994); see also MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3 (discussing the security interest
test).
Congress first adopted these two tests in 1968. These tests have since had a significant impact on the
structure of new tax legislation in two ways. See Livingston, supra note 76, at 1174. First, this legislation
used a “double negative” structure, in that state and local bonds were presumptively tax-exempt unless
they met one of the two above tests. Second, the legislation created exceptions for certain projects that,
while meeting either the business test or the security interest text, could nonetheless be financed using tax-
exempt non-IDB bonds. See id. at 1175-76.
In 1986, with the passage of the Tax Reform Act, the designations of the bond categories changed.
Bonds still fall into one of two categories: “private activity bonds” or “non-private activity bonds.” See
Cardwell & Bucholtz, supra note 79, at 681. The former “trade or business” test is now the “private
business use” test, and the “security interest test” is now the “private security or payment test”. See id. at
682; see also I.R.C. § 141(b)(1), (2) (1994); MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 380. Almost all of the
new provisions in 1986 made it harder to use tax-exempt financing, particularly for private activities. See
Livingston, supra note 76, at 1206. The Act reduced allowable private activity bonds to a maximum of
the greater of fifty dollars per capita or $150 million for an entire state. This limitation applies to all types
of private activity bonds. See id. This includes tax increment bonds, which are classified as qualified
redevelopment bonds. Tax increment bonds were previously exempt from any limits. See id.
In addition, more bonds now fall into the category of “private activity” bonds. See id. at 1207. This is
the case because under the old law, up to 25% of the amount of the bond issue was eligible for private use
before the bond was technically a private activity bond. See id. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a bond
is a private activity bond if, under the “use” test, any private business will use more than ten percent of the
proceeds of the project. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 141(b)(6)(A). “Use” does not include use as a member
of the general public. See Livingston, supra note 76, at 1207.
Under the “security interest” test, if more than ten percent of the principal or interest on the bonds is
repaid from, or secured by, a private business or private money, then the bond is a private activity bond.
See id. In addition, under the act, either “direct or indirect” repayment satisfies the security interest test.
See id. Therefore, “. . . private activity bonds include bonds that are economically, even if not legally,
repaid by a private business.” Id. The net effect of the Act, then, in addition to lowering the volume limit
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limitation.81 Further, under the Act, TIF bonds must apply ninety-five percent of
their proceeds to redevelop a blighted area and must be secured by “incremental
or general tax revenues of the issuing governmental unit.”82
TIF bonds must be issued under state enabling legislation and with a
redevelopment plan approved by the municipality.83 The redevelopment plan
must define a blighted area based on “state statutory criteria which take into
account all relevant factors and contain affirmative findings of a substantial
presence of these factors.”84 No more than twenty percent of the assessed value
of all real property in the municipality may be declared blighted. Further, any
particular blighted area must be at least “100 compact and contiguous acres” or
between ten and one hundred compact acres with no more than twenty-five
percent of the bond-financed land provided by any one person or related
persons.85
III. ANALYSIS
The adoption of TIF statutes has raised a number of issues, including equal
protection for taxpayers and affected districts,86 improper delegation of
on private activity bonds, was to make it “. . . significantly more difficult to avoid these limits.” Id.
81. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 301.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id. (internal quotations omitted).
85. See id. For a general discussion of whether these requirements represent an appropriate response
on the part of the federal government to a loss of revenue or an “inappropriate federal intrusion into local
and state prerogatives,” see id. at Chapter 8.
86. Commentators have challenged TIF statutes on the basis that they unfairly benefit developers
and those within the redevelopment area to the detriment of those outside the redevelopment area. See
Davidson, supra note 19, at 431. Courts, however, generally consider the overriding public purpose of
removal of blight as outweighing any slight advantage to those within the redevelopment area. See, e.g.,
Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48, 59-60 (Iowa 1975); Short v. City of Minneapolis, 269
N.W.2d 331, 338-40 (Minn. 1978); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 530 P.2d 499, 503-04 (Utah 1975).
Furthermore, proponents argue, residents outside of the redevelopment area are not deprived of tax
revenues because only the incremental increase in property value is used to retire the debts of the
redevelopment project. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 432. This again implicates the underlying
assumption that the increase in value of the land would not appear but for the redevelopment.
Assuming the project has a rational basis, and because the redevelopment project is considered to
benefit the community as a whole, a TIF project can overcome constitutional objections of unfair
treatment of those outside of the project area. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 432. A court generally will
not second-guess the judgment of a municipal government without a showing of significant procedural
defect or arbitrary and capricious conduct. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Missouri courts generally follow this Supreme Court guidance and hold that the clearing of blight in
itself is a public use and the selling of land to a private interest is irrelevant. See Dudley, supra note 2, at
96; see also Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. of Kansas City, 270 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1954). Courts
generally accept a legislative declaration of public purpose as conclusive unless such finding was arbitrary
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authority to the redevelopment commission,87 constitutional debt limitation
exceptions, finding of public purpose, and overly broad blight definitions. The
next section addresses TIF debt with respect to state constitutional debt
limitations.
A. Constitutional Debt Limitations
State and local governments face an inherent conflict when they act under a
TIF statute between the goal of eradicating blight and the goal of allowing the
public to voice its opinion on the projects and, therefore, the debts that the
municipality undertakes.88 Tax increment financing allows a municipality to act
without accountability to voters.89 Moreover, when a legislature gives municipal
governments little guidance on projects, and when these projects do not garner
much public attention, the potential for abuse and corruption increases.90
or induced by fraud, collusion, or bad faith, as shown by clear evidence. See Dalton, 270 S.W.2d at 52.
It is also important to note that if the TIF statute does not require a finding of blight; that is, an
economic development area may receive TIF funds, the court must be able to find that the economic
development purpose fulfills a valid public purpose. See Mandelker, supra note 17, at 16; see also
Meierhenry v. City of Huron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984). Professor Mandelker further notes that
detailed legislative findings on the public purpose of an economic development project will improve the
chance that a court will hold favorably as to the public purpose of a project, as courts generally grant
deference to such findings. See Mandelker, supra note 17, at 20.
87. In the TIF context, some have argued that by permitting a redevelopment authority to issue
bonds and incur debt, the legislature is improperly delegating its taxing authority. See Joseph F. Luther,
Tax Increment Financing: Municipalities Avoiding Voter Accountability, 1987 DET. C.L. REV. 89, 115.
For example, Kentucky declared its TIF statute unconstitutional on these grounds. See Miller v.
Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976). The court held that the statute granted too much
authority to redevelopment authorities. See id. at 5.
Other courts, including those in Missouri, have rejected this argument in deciding that the
redevelopment agency’s power is delegated directly by the state legislature. See In re Bunker Hill Urban
Renewal Project, 389 P.2d 538 (Cal. 1964). Because the agency’s power is derived from the state, the
collection of TIF revenue becomes a state concern. Therefore, TIF is not bound by home rule limitations,
which would implicate some rights for the affected taxing districts during the approval and allocation of
TIF projects. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 436-37.
Utah courts have found that the eradication of blight is a state concern and therefore the establishment
of a redevelopment agency with quasi-municipal state corporation is constitutional. See Tribe, 540 P.2d at
502-03. The dissent in Tribe, however, highlighted the possible dangers in “creatively” defining the nature
of a redevelopment authority in order to grant it discretion in TIF matters. The dissent expressed concern
that the uncontrolled discretion on the part of the redevelopment agency, combined with a vague definition
of “blight” and inadequate criteria and oversight in the establishment of TIF districts, could lead to abuses
of discretion on the part of the redevelopment agency, or at the least, a lack of concern for all economic
impacts of large TIF projects. Id. at 507-15; see also Davidson, supra note 19, at 437.
88. See Luther, supra note 87, at 116.
89. See id. Luther notes that “[s]erious fundamental problems arise, however, when all the branches
of government decide that the public is best served by not having a voice in municipal activities.
Elimination of voter accountability is the inherent defect in tax increment financing.” Id.
90. See id.
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Local governments may take advantage of voters’ lack of power and
continue to abuse their discretion, until, after a series of such abuses, voters take
notice of the abuse. This may be when it is too late, however, because projects
have already been built that voters might not have approved. Voters might have
chosen to keep their homes rather than selling to make way for another big-box
development that lends no unique aspect to the city.91
All states have limits on municipal debt in either constitutional or statutory
form.92 Further, nearly all states have provisions requiring approval by
referendum for general obligation long-term municipal debt.93 Therefore, unless
the municipality can circumvent the debt limitation94 by convincing a court that
the debt falls outside the limitation, a debt will violate one of these two
restrictions unless either the amount of the restriction, combined with all other
municipal debt obligations, does not exceed the local limit, or voter approval to
exceed the limit has been obtained.95
When a municipality issues bonds that it will repay with incremental tax
revenue, the credit of the municipality is implicated through its pledge to repay
the bonds at a specified rate of interest after a certain length of time.96
Therefore, even in states such as Missouri, where the TIF statute specifies that
the TIF debt incurred is not considered a debt of the city, courts may hold
91. See supra Part I. Again, this argument is not that there are no benefits to TIF, just that the
statute, as currently written, allows for abuses that violate the spirit of the law.
92. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 386.
93. See id.
94. One of the most common methods of avoiding constitutional debt limitations, and the one
implicated in TIF issues, is the Special Fund Doctrine. Under this principle, debt that is retired from
revenues other than general tax revenues, e.g., general project revenues, is not subject to municipal debt
limitations. These debts are not considered under debt limit provisions because they are not considered to
commit the full faith and credit of the municipality. For example, some municipal debt is financed through
a special assessment on real property. Even though bonds may be issued to pay the short-term costs of the
project, the bonds are retired solely through revenues from the special assessment on the property
involved. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 402. This applies to projects financed through the use
of TIF, because the increments generated through the increased property taxes are funneled into a “special
fund” used to retire the bonds. See supra Part II.
The difference with TIF, however, is that no matter how the funds are channeled, they are still tax
revenue, and are not generated through any sort of special assessment. See Richards, 237 N.W.2d at 57.
The court noted that if the bonds were repayable from the general revenue of the city, the constitutional
debt limit would be implicated. The simple fact that the TIF statute carved out just a portion of the city’s
revenues and limited the city’s liability to those revenues is irrelevant. “If the result were otherwise, a city
could divide its general revenues into several special funds, each with a bond issue restricted to recourse
against its own fund—and thus commit large portions of the city’s revenues without regard to [the
constitutional debt limitation which] . . . could thus be virtually nullified.” Id. at 64.
95. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 387.
96. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 438.
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otherwise.97 The crux of the issue centers around whether the commitment of a
municipality’s taxing power implicates the credit of the city, which would
require TIF to remain under constitutional debt limitations.98 Whe her the
implication of the municipality’s taxing power is formal or informal, the
concern has always been a municipality’s ability to repay its obligations out of
speculative future revenues.99
1. Missouri Constitutional Debt Limitation Provision
Missouri is no exception to the general rule. Under the Missouri
Constitution,100 voter approval is required if a municipality wants to use tax
revenues to retire debt it incurs in excess of its income and revenue for the
year.101 If the debt is not repaid by tax revenue, it is not a municipal debt.102 Tax
increment bonds, repaid from the property tax increment generated by a
redevelopment project, are repaid through taxation. If a court accepts, as
Missouri courts have, that the redevelopment agency is not an independent
agency, but rather an arm of the state or municipality, then this finding, coupled
with the expenditure of property tax revenue for the retirement of the bonds,
would seem to implicate the Missouri constitutional debt limitation.
Because the purpose of a constitutional debt limit is to keep a municipal
government from financially overextending itself, and because TIF statutes
provide few other restrictions, such as voter accountability, on municipal
government, state constitutional debt limitations should be implicated.
2. States that Hold TIF Bonds Subject to Debt Limitations
State courts are divided on the issue of whether debt incurred through the
TIF instrument is truly a debt of the city. Iowa,103 Arizona,104 South Dakota,105
97. See id. Further, it remains unclear exactly what would happen in the case of a municipality
defaulting or repaying late on the bonds it issues for a TIF redevelopment. See id.
98. See id. at 438-39.
99. See id. at 439.
100. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 26(a).
101. See State ex rel. Mitchell v. City of Sikeston, 555 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1977). In this case, the
proposed payment did not violate constitutional debt restrictions, because the municipality in question was
not using tax revenue to retire the debt. See id.
102. See id. Included in the constitutional limitation, therefore, is debt that is repaid either directly or
indirectly “by resort to taxation.” Id. at 292.
103. See Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1975). The constitutional provision at
issue prohibited a municipality from carrying debt amounting to more than five percent of the value of the
taxable property within the municipality. See IOWA CONST., art. XI, sec. 3; see also Richards, 237
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Kentucky,106 and Wisconsin107 have all held debt generated from a TIF project
to be subject to constitutional debt limits.
a. Iowa
In Richards v. Muscatine,108 the Iowa Supreme Court held that urban
renewal bonds did create an indebtedness by the city within the scope of the
N.W.2d 48 at 63. The proposed project would have placed the city $100,000 over its debt limit, if the TIF
bonds were considered a “debt” under the constitution. See id. at 63-64.
104. See City of Tucson v. Corbin, 623 P.2d 1239 (Ariz. 1980). The Arizona constitution requires
that bonds issued by a municipality must be approved by property owners. See ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, sec.
13. The state TIF statute provided that bonds issued by a municipality were not “a general obligation or
general debt of the municipality,” and the bonds were not subject to state municipal debt restrictions.
Corbin, 623 P.2d at 1241; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1481B (1993).
The court considered and rejected arguments that the TIF statute provided that the bonds were not
general obligations of the city, and that the bonds were retired from a special fund. See Corbin, 623 P.2d
at 1243. The court stated: “we must look to the transaction for what it is, and not what it is called.” Id. at
1243. Therefore, the court held, merely funneling tax revenue through a special fund “does not remove
these bonds from the category of obligations which must be approved by the voters under [the Arizona]
constitution.” Id. at 1243. The court quoted at length from a Washington Supreme Court opinion in
Washington State Finance Committee v. Martin, 384 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1963). The court in that case
held:
. . . the true test of [the special fund] . . . is not what comes out of the fund, but what goes into it . . . if the
state undertakes or agrees to provide any part of the fund from any general tax, be it excise or ad valorem,
then securities issued upon the credit of the fund are likewise issued upon the credit of the state and are in
truth debts of the state.
Id. at 842. Therefore, the Arizona court held the voters of the given district must have a vote on the
proposed redevelopment plan. See Corbin, 623 P.2d at 1245. The court further noted that California
amended its state constitution to exempt TIF from its municipal debt limit. Therefore, the voters in
California had a vote as to how their cities shouldered debt. See id. at 1245.
105. See Meierhenry v. City of Huron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984). The Supreme Court of South
Dakota has also held that tax increment bonds issued pursuant to the South Dakota TIF statute are debts
within the meaning of the South Dakota constitution. See id. at 178; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-
9-36 (Michie 1994). The statute stated that “[e]ach bond or note shall contain such recitals as are
necessary to show that it is only so payable and that it does not constitute a general indebtedness of the
municipality or a charge against its general taxing power.” Id.
The court agreed with the Supreme Court of Arizona and held that the court must look not to the
legislature’s classification of the bonds, but their true nature. See Meierhenry, 354 N.W.2d at 178;
Corbin, 623 P.2d 1239; see also supra note 104; Mettet v. City of Yankton, 25 N.W.2d 460 (S.D. 1946)
(holding when only source of payment of bonds was revenue from operation of a bridge, constitutional
debt limitation not implicated); Gross v. City of Bowdle, 182 N.W. 629 (S.D. 1921) (holding bonds paid
only by funds to be collected from special assessment and not by any general taxes were not an
indebtedness within the meaning of the state constitution).
The court, relying on City of Tucson v. Corbin, 623 P.2d 1239 (Ariz. 1981), Richards, 237 N.W.2d
48 (Iowa 1975), and Miller v. Covington Development Authority, 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976), held that
the indebtedness created through the TIF statute created a debt obligation under the state constitution and
was therefore subject to the constitutional debt limitation. See Meierhenry, 354 N.W.2d at 179.
106. See Miller v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976).
107. See City of Hartford v. Kirley, 493 N.W.2d 45 (Wis. 1992).
108. 237 N.W.2d at 65-66.
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state constitutional provision.109 The court observed that the purpose of a
constitutional provision limiting the ability of a municipality to incur debt is to
“prevent the general taxes of a political subdivision from becoming
overburdened by obligations.”110 The court stressed that the reality of the
situation was that the “credit” of a city lies in its power to assess general taxes,
and that when it pledges part of that power, it does pledge its credit and incur an
obligation.111 The court held that only that part of the proposed project which
would keep the city’s debt within the constitutional limit was permissible.112
b. Kentucky
The Kentucky Supreme Court held the Kentucky TIF statute
unconstitutional in Miller v. Covington Development Authority.113 The court
observed that the mayor appointed members of the redevelopment commission
and stressed the important notion that a legislative body should not divest itself
of its legislative power. The court held that one reason the Kentucky TIF
legislation was unconstitutional was that “[i]t authorize[d] the agency to
exercise choices that the people are entitled to have exercised by their elected
representatives.”114 The court then held that the incremental ad valorem tax
revenues, which were to be used to retire the bonds, could not be placed in the
category of “special funds.”115 Since the “ad valorem tax is the one tax that is
mandatory” under the Kentucky constitution, the court found that tax to be “the
ultimate resource of its fiscal integrity.”116 Therefore, any project that uses
109. Id.
110. Id. at 64.
111. See id.; see also City of Ottumwa v. City Water Supply Co., 119 F. 315 (8th Cir. 1902); City
of Redondo Beach v. Taxpayers, Property Owners, Citizens and Electors of the City of Redondo Beach,
352 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1960) (holding that sales, use, and license taxes were general tax revenues, that those
revenues were used to retire bonds, and that bonds were a debt under California constitutional debt
limitation clause); Brunk v. City of Des Moines, 291 N.W. 395 (Iowa 1940) (holding bonds payable from
fund created by levy of special tax constitute indebtedness under the constitution); Windsor v. City of Des
Moines, 81 N.W. 487 (Iowa 1900) (holding that special tax to be levied in the future to pay expenses for
electric plant constitutes debt).
112. See Richards, 237 N.W.2d at 66. This disallowed just $100,000 of the $800,000 proposed
project. See id. at 64.
113. 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976).
114. Id. at 4. The court said: “[i]f there is one essential characteristic inherent in legislative power, it
is that such power must be exercised by an elected representative or representatives of the people, and not
by a person, persons or agency created or designated by those representatives.” Id. The court therefore
recognized the fundamental flaw of TIF legislation in general: lack of voter accountability.
115. See id. at 5.
116. Id.
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property tax revenue is a debt under the Kentucky constitution.117
3. States Holding TIF Debt Not Subject to Debt Limitations
In contrast to the states discussed above, several states, including Indiana,118
Colorado,119 Florida,120 Utah,121 and Missouri, maintain that TIF debt is not
subject to municipal debt limitations.122 These courts typically base their
decisions on the formalistic notion that the debt obligation is repaid from a
“special fund,” and not through tax revenue.123 This special fund garners its
revenue from the TIF project financed by the bonds.124 The inherent
contradiction in this, of course, is that all of the money paid into the “special
fund” is generated through the additional property tax generated from the
redeveloped property.125
117. See id.
118. See South Bend Pub. Transp. Corp. v. City of South Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217 (Ind. 1981); see
also IND. CODE § 36-7-14-25. The court held that TIF bonds were not subject to constitutional debt
limitations. See IND. CONST. art. 13, sec. 1. The Indiana court based its holding on two findings. The
court first deferred to the Indiana legislature’s power to create special taxing districts, as distinct entities
from municipal corporations. Indiana’s constitutional debt limitation does not apply to special taxing
districts, and so did not apply in the case at bar. See South Bend Pub. Transp. Corp., 428 N.E.2d at 220.
Second, the appellants argued that since the TIF bonds ultimately pledged the general taxing power of the
municipality, they constitute debt. The court disagreed, noting:
The Redevelopment Commission can only apply incremental tax revenues which are attributable to
increases in the assessed value of taxable property in the Allocation Area to the repayment of the bonds. If
the value of property does not increase, the bonds will not be repaid. Therefore, the original taxing power
of the municipality will not be changed.
Id. at 221.
119. See Denver Urb. Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980); see also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 31-25-107(9) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); COLO. CONST. art. XI, sec. 6 (West 1990). The court
based its holding on the fact that:
The tax allocation structure has been carefully drafted so that there is a direct relationship between the
increased valuation of property within the project area, and thus, increased ad valorem tax revenues, and
the project financed by the bond issue. Denver has not lost the benefit of any ad valorem tax revenues
which would otherwise have been available for its general revenue purposes had the plan never been
adopted.
618 P.2d at 1382.
120. See Florida v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1980); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VII, sec. 12 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 163.387 (1994).
121. See Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); see also UTAH CONST. art. 14,
sec. 3, 4 (Michie 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17a-2-1260 et seq. (1994).
122. See Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1989); see also
MO. CONST. art. VI, sec. 27(b); MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805 (1994).
123. This principle is known as the Special Fund Doctrine. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 3, at
402-04.
124. See South Bend Pub. Tansp. Corp., 428 N.E.2d at 220-21; J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d
at 77.
125. See Michel, supra note 74, at 464-65.
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The Missouri Supreme Court explained its reasoning on this issue in Tax
Increment Financing Commission of Kansas City v. J.E. Dunn Construction
Co., Inc.126 in 1989. Relying on its earlier interpretation of article VI, section
26(a) of the Missouri Constitution in Mitchell v. City of Sikeston,127 the court
held that, because PILOTS128 are “special assessments” paid into a “special
fund” by the redevelopment district, PILOTS are not taxes.129 The court further
noted that the essential character of PILOTS is not changed, even though they
are “measured” by the assessed value of the redeveloped property.130 Theref r ,
under Mitchell, because PILOTS are not taxes, TIF debt is not subject to
municipal debt limitations, nor is it subject to voter approval.131
4. Critique
States holding that debt from TIF projects is not subject to state
constitutional debt limitations do so largely through a semantical manipulation
of the TIF statute. Even statutes, such as Missouri’s,132 that expressly state that
TIF debt is not subject to constitutional debt limitations ignore the underlying
reality of TIF projects.
126. 781 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1989).
127. 555 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1977). At issue in this case was whether bonds issued by Sikeston to
build a plant to supply electricity, which were to be retired through revenues generated by selling the
electricity to neighboring municipalities, were subject to the constitutional debt limitation. See id. at 283.
The court held that this obligation was not an indebtedness of the municipality under article VI of the state
constitution. See id. at 292.
The standard in determining what constitutes indebtedness under the constitution is as follows: “It has
been held repeatedly in this state that the constitutional limitation imposed by . . . the Missouri
Constitution on the indebtedness a political corporation may incur, contemplates a debt which must be
paid directly or indirectly by resort to taxation.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also
Wunderlich v. St. Louis, 511 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Mo. 1974). The Mitchell court further noted:
It is likewise well established that the ‘special fund doctrine’ prevails in Missouri, and that an
indebtedness of a city or other like political corporation payable only out of income derived from the
property purchased is not a debt within the meaning of the above provision of the Constitution. . . . But if
the special fund pledged to the payment of the debt must be replenished by taxation, the contrary is
true. . . . The proscription against municipal indebtedness without voter approval is only applicable in a
situation where the municipality proposes to expend tax revenues.
Mitchell, 555 S.W.2d at 292. In this case, because the bonds were to be repaid solely from the revenues of
the electrical plant, the taxing power of the municipality was not obligated. See id.
128. See supra Part II.
129. J.E. Dunn, 781 S.W.2d at 77.
130. Id. In addition to relying on the arguments presented in Mitchell, 555 S.W.2d 281, the court
argued that, since PILOTS are not “initially available for deposit into the general fund of the taxing
districts,” they cannot be taxes. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d at 77.
131. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d at 77.
132. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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As the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in Hartford v. Kirley,133 the court
should look past the legislature’s “recital that TIF bonds do not constitute a debt
within the meaning of the constitution [and] examine the substance of the
obligations to ascertain their effect . . . .”134 A legislative statement about the
character of the bonds should not control a court’s determination.135
Upon determination that a legislative declaration is not controlling, a court
should next consider the underlying purpose of a constitutional debt limitation
as reflective of a desire to ensure that municipalities not overburden themselves
with debt they cannot pay.136 Courts which uphold a legislative determination
that TIF bonds are not subject to constitutional debt limitations essentially
ignore this broader purpose behind the constitutional provision.
A court that holds TIF debt not subject to constitutional debt limitations
further ignores the underlying reality of such a limitation when, as the Supreme
Court of Missouri has done, it allows the diversion of property tax revenue into
a special fund and declares that all money from that fund is therefore not
“revenue from taxes.”137 As the Iowa Supreme Court noted in Richards v. City
of Muscatine,138 the character of revenue does not change simply because a law
carves out a portion of a city’s general revenue and limits the liability of the city
with respect to those revenues. As the court noted, “[i]f the result were
otherwise, a city could divide its general revenues into several special funds,
each with a bond issue restricted to recourse against its own fund—and thus
commit large portions of the city’s revenues without regard to [constitutional
debt limits].”139 Therefore, when a court respects a legislatively-created fiction
which only diverts tax revenue, it circumvents the state constitution in an
impermissible way. Moreover, by allowing circumvention of the constitutional
debt limitation in this way, courts open the door to further abuses by
municipalities through the creation of other “special funds.” Therefore, courts
should respect the underlying reality of TIF funds as diversions of property tax
revenue and hold TIF debt subject to state constitutional debt limitations.
IV.  PROPOSAL
133. 493 N.W.2d 45 (Wis. 1992).
134. Id. at 50.
135. See id. at 51.
136. See id.
137. See Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n of Kansas City v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70, 77
(Mo. 1989).
138. 237 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1975).
139. Id. at 64.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p919 note Goshorn.doc 02/01/00   5:33 PM
944 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:919
As this Note has discussed, Missouri’s TIF statute, through its vague
definition of blight and its lack of voter accountability, creates inter-municipality
competition and does not benefit areas that are truly in need of redevelopment.
Therefore, this Note proposes two revisions to the Missouri TIF statute: a more
restrictive definition of blight, and the application of constitutional debt
limitations to TIF bonds. This will allow TIF to remain a useful and productive
redevelopment tool, but will help eliminate the current abusive “cart before the
horse” practices angering Missouri voters.
A. Definition of Blight
Missouri’s current statutory definition of “blight” is too broad to provide
any significant restriction on the discretion of private developers and
municipalities in choosing redevelopment sites. The Missouri Legislature should
amend the TIF statute to require a more definitive “but for” finding with respect
to blight conditions on a particular parcel of land. For example, the legislature
could revise sections 99.805 and 99.810140 to read as follows:
§ 99.805. Definitions
As used in sections 99.800 to 99.865, unless the context clearly
requires otherwise, the following terms shall mean:
(1) “Blighted area,” an area that satisfies either (a) or (b) below:
(a) Buildings in the area are:
1. Unsanitary, unsafe for living or working;
2. Substantially vacant; or
3. Subject to a crime rate significantly higher than other
surrounding neighborhoods.
(b) The area in general is characterized by:
1. Pervasive poverty, unemployment, and general distress, as
evidenced by
a. At least seventy-five percent of the residents living in the
area have incomes below eighty percent of the median income of
all residents within the state of Missouri; and,
b. The level of unemployment of persons within the area
exceeds one and one-half times the average rate of unemployment
for the state of Missouri over the previous twelve months.
2. A cost benefit analysis, performed by an independent
140. For the current text of these two sections, see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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contractor, that enumerates the effect of the project on tax revenues if
the project is built both with the proposed tax increment financing
and without the tax increment financing, with a required showing of
substantial and certain long-term economic feasibility and benefit to
the affected taxing districts in order for approval of the proposed
plan.141
These revisions would help ensure that proposed projects in areas that would
be likely to receive private investment would not qualify for tax increment
financing under the statute, and would thus help fulfill the underlying rationale
of the TIF statute in three ways. First, the revised statute would preserve to a
greater extent the normal market equilibrium by using TIF as a tool of last
resort. By allowing public assistance only after a determination that the area is
unlikely to receive private investment moneys in the foreseeable future and that
such investment is necessary to prevent the area from becoming a drain on the
property tax base of the area, the proposed revision would help stem the flow of
private investment from one bidding municipality to the next.
Second, by determining that property values will certainly decline in the
foreseeable future without public assistance, the proposed revision will curb the
public financing of projects that will merely cause property values to increase
more, or at a higher rate.142
Third, by requiring an explicit finding that the increase in property values
will be due to public intervention in the form of the redevelopment project, the
proposed revision further ensures that the diversion of revenue to retire TIF
bonds is justified. If the redevelopment is not the sole stimulus for the increased
property values, however, the TIF project is not justified. Therefore,
implementation of a statutory revision similar to the one proposed herein would
help curb abuses of the TIF statute and would help stimulate private
development in those areas that are truly “blighted” under the language and
spirit of the TIF statute.
141. Substantial portions of this text are borrowed from Representative Rizzo’s 1997 proposed
changes to Missouri’s TIF statute. See H.B. 131, 89th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997); see also supra
notes 22, 51 and accompanying text.
142. As discussed above, the impetus behind TIF is not necessarily to ensure that all property is put to
its single, best use. Instead, TIF should be a tool of last resort used only when property values have
declined to such a degree that but for the TIF, private developers would not utilize the land. This is an
assumption of primary importance when one considers how TIF operates, because, unless the property
value will decline or at least remain constant, freezing the property assessment will result in lost property
tax revenue to the taxing district. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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B. Debt Limitation
Although the TIF statute specifies,143 and the Missouri Supreme Court has
held,144 that revenue from TIF bonds is not a general obligation of the
municipality and therefore not subject to either municipal debt limitations or
voter approval, the Missouri Legislature should amend the TIF statute to
require that TIF bonds are subject to the constitutional debt limitation.145 Doing
so would require voter approval of any TIF project that would put a
municipality in the position of having its debt exceed its revenue for the year.146
This would provide two checks on unfettered TIF spending. First, municipalities
would be forced to weigh projects against each other in order to maximize their
limited resources. Second, for any debt that exceeded five percent of the value of
the taxable property within the municipality,147 voter approval would be
required. This requirement would allow voters a more active role in municipal
governance and a greater choice in the development of their own community.
This requirement would also provide the ultimate oversight for the dangerous
combination of profit-maximizing private developers and overeager municipal
authorities.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note explains and highlights both the potential benefits and detriments
of a typical TIF statute. The problems found in Missouri are typical of similarly
drafted TIF statutes, although some states have experienced problems of a more
serious nature. The reforms suggested are by no means the only cure for the
afflicted TIF statute, but through such changes, the TIF statute would become a
more effective tool to redevelop and revitalize blighted urban areas and would
thus benefit those most in need of aid.
Julie A. Goshorn
143. See MO. REV. STAT. § 99.835 (1994); see also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
144. See Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n of Kansas City v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70 (Mo.
1989); see also notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
145. For example, the amendment could take the form of simply replacing the wording “[t]he
obligations shall not constitute indebtedness within the meaning of any constitutional, statutory or charter
debt limitation or restriction,” see MO. REV. STAT. § 99.835.5 (1994), with a statement making clear the
intention to subject TIF debt to state constitutional debt limitations.
146. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
147. See Mo. Const. art. VI, sec. 26(b); see also supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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